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Administrative Law-Constitutional Law-Is Governmental Policy
Affecting the Employment of Homosexuals Rational?
"I accept the moral responsibility to account to my God for my own
conduct. I accept the moral responsibility to account to my fellow men
for any conduct which causes them 'demonstrable harm.' I ask only
that a spirit of tolerance prevail in the exchange."'
Thus spoke the plaintiff in Schlegel v. United States2 in contesting
his removal from an Army Civil Service position for immoral and in-
decent conduct. Schlegel was specifically charged with having engaged
in four homosexual acts with three different men over a period of a year.
These alleged acts became known to intelligence officials during a routine
background investigation by the Army for upgrading his Secret security
clearance to Top Secret. To sustain his removal, the Court of Claims had
to find that Schlegel's conduct affected his job, reflected discredit upon
the employing installation, or detrimentally affected the efficiency of the
service.8 Furthermore, since the plaintiff was a veteran, he fell within the
ambit of protection afforded by the Veterans' Preference Act4 so that his
removal had to promote the efficiency of the service.
'Schlegel v. United States, No. 369-63 at 30-31 (Ct. Cl., Oct. 17, 1969). The
quotation is from the findings of fact.
2416 F.2d 1372 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 38 U.S.L.W. 3403 (U.S. April 21,
1970).
'Id. at 1373-77. The court followed the guidelines of DEP'T OF THE ARMY
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL REGULATIONS S1.3-3c(2) (1961) in setting out the tests for
justifying removal. Id. at 1377.
Judicial review of administrative actions is an uncertain area of the law.
It seems clear that an abuse of discretion or arbitrary actions are subject to cor-
rection by the courts, especially when they may have a stigmatizing affect. See
Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 US.. 551 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff,
344 U.S. 183 (1952). But see Murray v. Macy, Civil No. 67-382 (N.D. Ala.,
Nov. 27, 1967), aff'd sub nom. Anonymous v. Macy, 398 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1968)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1041 (1969).
Additional procedural problems, such as the rights of the accused to subpoena
and to cross-examine witnesses, are generated by administrative actions. Such
difficulties existed in Schlegel and in the other principal cases discussed in this
note, but consideration of them is beyond its scope. See generally Note, Admin-
istrative Law--Evidence-Hearsay and the Right of Confrontation in Admin-
istrative Hearings, 48 N.C.L. Rv. 608 (1970).
"5 U.S.C. § 7512(a) (Supp. IV, 1965-68). The Act provides that a veteran
can be discharged from the Civil Service only for such cause as will promote the
efficiency of the service.
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The court found that the burden of establishing compliance with the
Act was satisfied by the testimony of the plaintiff's superiors that the
morale and efficiency of the office would have been affected by his con-
tinued presence. Moreover, the court reasoned that since homosexual acts
are immoral and indecent, efficiency would inevitably be adversely affected
by allowing one who had engaged in such acts to remain in Civil Service.'
The Court of Claims distinguished on the facts Norton v. Macy,6
an earlier decision by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
In Norton two of the three judges rejected the government's contention
that, once the label "immoral" is plausibly attached to an employee's off-
duty conduct, further inquiry into an adequate rational cause for his
removal is unnecessary.7 The plaintiff, a veteran, committed what the
court believed to be a homosexual advance by feeling the leg of a stranger
who had accepted a ride from him and by inviting the man to his apart-
ment for a drink. Following the incident with the stranger, the plaintiff
admitted to government investigators that he had engaged in mutual
masturbation with other males in high school and college; had homosexual
desires while drinking; and occasionally had undergone a temporary
blackout after drinking, during two of which occasions he suspected that
he might have engaged in homosexual activity.' The Civil Service Com-
mission considered this evidence sufficient to warrant dismissal from
the service, but the court, disagreeing, stated that a reasonable connection
between the alleged conduct and the efficiency of the service had to
416 F.2d at 1378.
417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
TId. at 1165. The court also refused to adhere to the decision of the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Anonymous v. Macy, 398 F.2d 317 (5th Cir.
1968), that courts have no authority to review on the merits a determination by
the Civil Service Commission of fitness of an employee. Id. at 1163-65.
The plaintiff in Anonynwns had nearly nineteen years of federal service and
was a postal-window clerk in a small Alabama town whose citizens held him in
high regard. A sailor, while in the brig of a Naval base in Florida, had admitted
having participated with him in homosexual acts; and the plaintiff, questioned by
authorities shortly thereafter, confessed to other private consensual acts that were
in no way connected with his job. A psychiatrist testified that a wound received
in World War II had rendered the employee impotent and had ultimately led to
his participation in homosexual activities, which were not sufficient to classify
him a pervert or sexual deviant. The psychiatrist further testified that the em-
ployee was of gentle disposition and low sexual drive and was far less likely to
act violently than the average adult male; too, the acts would in no way affect his
ability to perform his job. Nevertheless, the plaintiff's confession led to his dis-
charge and a losing struggle in the federal courts. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari
at 3-12, Murray v. Macy, 393 U.S. 1041 (1969) (petition denied).
8 417 F.2d at 1162-63.
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be demonstrated to justify discharge.9 However, the court limited its
decision to the particular circumstances involved and stated flatly that
it was not holding that homosexual conduct may never be cause for
dismissal of a federal employee protected by the Veterans' Preference
Act.10 Nor did the court conclude that potential embarrassment from an
employee's private conduct could not affect the efficiency of the service.'1
Indeed, the court manifested this circumscription in Norton a scant
five months later in Adams v. Laird.1 2 The majority in Adams upheld the
denial to the plaintiff, employed by private industry in defense-related
work, of a Top Secret security clearance and the suspension of his Secret
clearance based on findings of homosexual conduct. His conduct had
come to light during the background investigation to examine the
appropriateness of upgrading his security clearance.13 One judge, object-
ing to the assumption that all homosexuals are security risks, dissented
vigorously on the ground that no relationship between the alleged homo-
sexual conduct and Adam's ability to protect classified information had
been demonstrated.' 4
Notwithstanding Adams and Schlegel, Norton represents a new dawn
in the plight of homosexual federal employees, for it threatens a hereto-
fore unquestioned federal policy of regarding homosexual acts as an
ipso facto basis for dismissal from the Civil Service." This policy stems
9 Id. at 1162. But see Dew v. Halaby, 317 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1963). Note,
however, the court's treatment of this case in Norton. 417 F.2d at 1166.
10 See note 4 supra.
11417 F.2d at 1168. "What we do say is that ... an agency cannot support
a dismissal as promoting the efficiency of the service merely by turning its head
and crying 'shame."' Id. The court pointedly distinguished the type of embarrass-
ment or discredit that financial irresponsibility of a governmental employee would
create. The effect in such an instance is more ascertainable and concrete than a
general tarnishing of an agency's antiseptic public image. Id. For an incisive
analysis of homosexuality and the efficiency of the Civil Service, which presaged
Norton by one month, see Note, Government-Created Employment Disabilities of
the Homosexual, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1738 (1969).
10420 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 38 U.S.L.W. 3404 (U.S. April 21,
1970). Two of the judges who decided Norton sat on the court in Adams. The
dissenting judge in Norton voted in the majority in Adams, and the other judge,
who was with the majority in Norton, dissented strongly. It is interesting to specu-
late what would have happened had the third judge in Adans been the second judge
who voted with the majority in Norton.
Is Id. at 232-34. Without the proper security clearance, Adams was effectively
precluded from technical occupations for which he was highly qualified. Id. at
241; Affidavit No. 1 of Robert Larry Adams, filed in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, March 8, 1968.
1* 420 F.2d at 240-42.5 1n Scott v. Macy, 349 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1965), the court overruled a dis-
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primarily from public repugnance to homosexual behavior" and repre-
sents a fear by the government of the loss of public confidence and of the
discomfiting effect on other employees if known homosexuals are allowed
to remain in employment.17 As indicated by Adams, a fear of compromise
of classified information is also often involved.
missal by the Civil Service Commission of an employee on a general charge of
homosexual conduct. The Commission did not specify the exact acts with which
the employee was charged, and the court held that the basis for dismissal was im-
permissibly vague. Dictum indicated that the court would demand for the Com-
mission to show how the individual's conduct related to his occupational fitness.
Id. at 184-85. A similar result obtained in a subsequent action brought by the
Commission against Scott based on the same alleged conduct. The court did not
feel that the earlier problem of ambiguity had been resolved and reversed again.
Scott v. Macy, 402 F.2d 644, 647-48 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
Dissenting in both cases, the current Chief Justice of the United States, who
then sat on the court of appeals, indicated that it was unnecessary for the Com-
mission to relate the alleged homosexual conduct with suitability for federal em-
ployment; disqualification based solely on homosexual conduct, he contended, was
not arbitrary. 349 F.2d at 189-90, 402 F.2d at 652. Cf. Wyngaard v. Kennedy, 295
F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (per curiam). But see Boutilier v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 387 U.S. 118, 125-35 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
" A recent Louis Harris poll reported that sixty-three per cent of the people
of the nation regard homosexuals as harmful to American life. The Homosexual:
Newly Visible, Newly Understood, TImE, Oct. 31, 1969, at 61 [hereinafter cited
as TimE, Oct. 31, 1969]. This poll was in accord with one taken a short while
earlier. Slovenko, Sexual Deviation: Response to an Adaptational Crisis, 40 U.
CoLo. L. REv. 222, 233 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Slovenko].
' See Scott v. Macy, 402 F.2d 644, 648-49 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ; Note, Government-
Created Employment Disabilities of the Homosexual, supra note 11, at 1741-46.
The Civil Service Commission has indicated that it would admit homosexuals in
service as soon as the general public comes to view them with less repulsion. The
Commission claims that it avoids expelling homosexuals with many years of
service and excludes only those whose homosexuality is a matter of public
knowledge or record. Id. at 1742, 1745-46. In the principal cases discussed in this
note, however, the homosexual acts of the plaintiffs became a part of the public
record only after the government took action against them. See also note 7 supra.
Illuminating federal policy is a letter from the Civil Service Commission to
the plaintiff's attorney during the litigation in Murray v. Macy, Civil No. 67-382
(N.D. Ala., Nov. 27, 1967), aff'd sub nom. Anonymous v. Macy, 398 F.2d 317
(5th Cir. 1968) (per curiam), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1041 (1969). The letter
quoted in part another letter, addressed to the Mattachine Society, from Commission
Chairman John W. Macy, Jr., dated February 25, 1966:
Suitability determinations also comprehend the total impact of the applicant
upon his job. Pertinent considerations here are the revulsion of other em-
ployees by homosexual conduct and the consequent disruption of service
efficiency, the apprehension caused other employees by homosexual advances,
solicitations or assaults, the unadvoidable [sic] subjection of the sexual
deviate to errotic [sic] stimulation through on-the-job use of common toilet,
shower, and living facilities, the offense to members of the public who are
required to deal with a known or admitted sexual deviate to transact
Government business, the hazard that the prestige and authority of a
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The federal policy contributes significantly to the stigmatization
suffered by those whose homosexual conduct is uncovered. Such stig-
matization usually not only results in the loss of job and reputation but
also severely hinders the search for a new job. One caught engaging in
homosexual conduct suffers the alienation of friends and family and may
be forced into the "gay" world by social ostracism even though the con-
duct may have been an isolated incident caused by curiosity, seduction,
or other reasons. Engaging in homosexual acts may render one par-
ticularly vulnerable to extortionists; to criminal assaults; to harassment
by police and private citizens; and, perhaps most disconcertingly of all,
to official and community indifference to his trammeled rights.,,
In this light, the pragmatic mind must seek a rationale for the
penalizing intolerance of homosexual behavior because constitutional
repercussions may result if no rational basis can be found: while the
Constitution imposes no direct restraint on private irrationality, through
the due process clause it does forbid irrational governmental deprivation
of liberty and property.'9 Other constitutional mandates 20 may also be
affected by a determination that the general federal 2' policy works irra-
Government position will be used to foster homosexual activity, particu-
larly among the youth, and the use of Government funds and authority
in furtherance of conduct offensive both to the mores and the law of our
society.
Appendix D to Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, Murray v. Macy, 393 U.S. 1041
(1969) (petition denied).
" See W. CHURCHILL, HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR AMONG MALES 226 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as CHURCHILL]; A. ELLIS, HOMOSEXUALITY: ITS CAUSES AND
CURE 87-90 (1965) [hereinafter cited as ELLIS]; P. GEBHARD, 3. GAGNON, W.
POMEROY, & C. CHRISTENSON, SEX OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF TYPES 623
(1965) [hereinafter cited as GEBHARD]; A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY, & C. MARTIN,
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 663 (1948) [hereinafter cited as
KINSEY/MALE]; E. SCHUR, CRIMES WITHOUT VICTIMS 83 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as ScHuR]I; Cantor, Deviation and the Criminal Law, 55 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 441, 449-51 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Cantor]; Slovenko at 236 n.41.
"'There is controversy over the application of substantive due process to pro-
tect individuals within the public sector against arbitrary governmental action.
See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
2 The right to privacy, as illumined by such decisions as Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), may be invaded by governmental efforts to ferret out
homosexuals. But note the dictum contained in Justice Goldberg's concurring
opinion to that case. Id. at 498-99. Also, the constitutional sanction against cruel
and unusual punishment may be violated by criminally punishing private, adult,
consensual homosexual practices. See Perkins v. North Carolina, 234 F. Supp.
333, 337 (W.D.N.C. 1964).
"1 Of course, state and local governmental policies and laws would be similarly
affected by the fourteenth amendment.
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tionally to severely penalize homosexual behavior ipso facto without
regard to individual circumstances.
To determine rationality, one must seek knowledge of the causes
and ramifications of homosexual behavior. At the start, one should under-
stand that not all those who manifest homosexual behavior are truly
homosexual. A substantial number of persons, who are basically hetero-
sexual, engage in homosexual acts for a variety of reasons, including
curiosity, seduction, or peculiar situational demands such as those con-
fronting prisoners whose sexual outlet is limited. Still others may parti-
cipate in homosexual conduct simply because they seek any convenient
relief for their sexual drive and are not particular about the means.
The terms "homosexual" and "homosexuality" properly describe only
persons who are dominantly or exclusively homosexually oriented.
22
Some authorities believe that man is born with a neutral sexual dis-
position that is subjected to environmental conditioning leading to a
particular preference. They would agree with Kinsey that "[t]here is
nothing known in the anatomy or physiology of sexual response and
orgasm which distinguishes masturbatory, heterosexual, or homosexual
reactions." 23 According to this theory, humans are born with a potential
2
2 GROUP FOR THE ADVANcEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY REPORT No. 30 at 2-3 (Jan.
1955) [hereinafter cited as GRouP]; KINSEY/MALE at 615-66; Bowman and Engle,
A Psychiatric Evaluation of Laws of Honosexuiality, 29 TEMP. L.Q. 273, 313
(1956) [hereinafter cited as Bowman and Engle]; Glueck, An Evalutation of
the Homosexual Offender, 41 MINN. L. REv. 187, 194 (1957) [hereinafter cited
as Glueck].
Kinsey's research revealed that, as a minimum, thirty-seven per cent of Ameri-
can males have had at least one overt homosexual experience to the point of
orgasm between adolescence and old age. Ten per cent are more or less ex-
clusively homosexual for at least three years between the ages of sixteen and
fifty-five, and four per cent are exclusively homosexual throughout their lives after
the onset of adolescence. These figures are probably understatements. KINSEY/
MALE at 623-25, 650-51.
Kinsey reasoned that the incidence and frequency of homosexual behavior,
similar throughout all strata of American society, militated against the view that
erotic sexual reactions between individuals of the same sex are abnormal or
unnatural. KIwsEY/MALE at 659. He is reported to have remarked that "[tlhe only
kind of abnormal sex acts are those that are impossible to perform." CHURCHILL
at 69. For a criticism of Kinsey's reasoning, see Kubie, Psychiatric Implications
of the Kinsey Report, 10 PSYCHOSOMATIC MEDICINE, Mar. 1948, at 95.
There is no evidence that homosexuality involves more males, or fewer males,
today than it did among earlier generations. Furthermore, if all persons with
any trace of homosexual history were eliminated from today's population, there
is no reason for believing that the incidence of homosexuality in the next genera-
tion would be materially reduced. KINSEY/MALE at 631, 666.
"A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY, C. MARTIN, & P. GEBUARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR
IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 446-47 (1953) [hereinafter cited as KINSEY/FEMALE].
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
to respond erotically to sexual stimulus without regard to the gender
of the source; man has come to prefer a heterosexual outlet only because
of the conditioning effect of his culture."4 Therefore, sexual gratification
with a member of one's own sex may be considered just as "natural" a
response as with a member of the opposite sex, but the latter inclination
may predominate in a given society by virtue of historically developed
norms that are taught and adhered to by custom from generation to
generation. 25
Other authorities would not be content with this view of homosexual
behavior as far as the dominant or exclusive homosexual is concerned.
They would agree that homosexuality is not a product of any known
hormonal or chromosomal factors2" but would contend that there must be
something amiss in the basic constitution of the homosexual since he under-
takes great personal risk in pursuing his sexual inclination to the exclusion
of the less portentous offerings of heterosexual relief. Perhaps man may
learn through conditioning to enjoy one erotic stimulus more than others,
but he also learns the mores of his society and the personal risks of flouting
them. American society is extremely hostile to the homosexual, 2  and
hence it is enigmatic that some Americans persist in and prefer a homo-
sexual outlet for the basic sexual drive.2s To explain this enigma, these
authorities assert that homosexuality appears to be a product of per-
sonality development of such a subtle nature as to avoid a conscious recog-
nition and to preclude a conscious choice.20 Beyond this basic premise,
there is considerable divergence of opinion on causative factors, but at
least two general schools of thought emerge.
Present-day adherents of basic Freudian theory80 insist that adult
"See CHURCHiLL at 101-05; ELLIS at 78; KINSEY/FEMALE at 446-47, 481;
Marmor, Introduction in SEXUAL INVERSION: THE MULTIPLE ROOTS OF HOMO-
SEXUALITY 9-16 (J. Marmor ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as Marmor]." For general discussions of the historical, religious, and anthropological aspects
of homosexuality, see CHURCHILL at 199-210; GROUP at 1-2; KINSEY/FEMALE at
481-83; Taylor, Historical and Mythological Aspects of Homosexuality in SEXUAL
INVERSION, supra note 24, at 140; Bowman and Engle at 276-78. See also Note,
The Law of Crime Against Nature, 32 N.C.L. REV. 312 (1954).
2" CHtURcHILL at 105; GROUP at 3, 6; Pare, Etiology of Homosexuality: Genetic
and Chromosoinul Aspects in SEXUAL INVERSION, supra note 24, at 70; Perloff,
Hormones and Homosexuality in SEXUAL INVERSION, supra note 24, at 44.
" KINsEY/FEMALE at 477, 483. Cf. CHURCHILL at 199-210; Szasz, Legal and
Moral Aspects of Homosexuality in SEXUAL INVERSION, supra note 24, at 128.
See ELLIS at 78-84; GROUP at 2; Marmor at 11.
GROUP at 3; Marmor at 11-15; Cantor at 442.
Freudian theory has been described as "the departure point for all subsequent
explorations." C. SOCARIDES, THE OVERT HOMOSEXUAL 22 (1968). Dr. Socarides
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homosexuality represents an arrest of, or a pressured regression to, a
universal childhood phase of personality development that is homo-
erotically oriented-a phase of maturation wherein the child's instinctive
disposition for social intercourse and sexual exploration leans toward
those of his own sex.3 ' On the other hand, proponents of modern
psychoanalytic theory challenge the idea that adult homosexual preference
manifests a carry-over of a childhood phase. Rather, they assert that
adult homosexuality represents an unconscious, incapacitating anxiety
toward heterosexual relations. Homosexual release of the basic sex drive
is easier than confronting this deep, unfathomable anxiety. 2
Briefly stated, an important difference between these theories is that
the latter interprets heterosexuality as a basic tendency of man and
homosexuality as a manifestation of some psychological obstacle to hetero-
sexual adaptation.3 Those who adhere to the former theory admit of no
basic heterosexual tendency while regarding homosexual adaptation,
though at odds with cultural expectations, as the probable resultant of
the interplay of environmental influences and the process of maturation.34
Whatever theory, or amalgamation of theories, is followed, there is
significant support for the belief that the underlying impediment to hetero-
sexual orientation is rooted in personality development. Early environ-
mental circumstances, especially within the immediate family,"3 and other
socio-economic and cultural forces amass to shape personality; and some
subtle interplay among numerous, multifarious factors affects the course
of development. One may broadly conclude, then, that an enigmatic quirk
in personality development, quite beyond the control of the individual,
ultimately leads to a homosexual predisposition26
is critical of Freud's view that homosexuality cannot be considered an illness. For
a capsule form of Dr. Socarides' concepts, see TIME, Oct. 31, 1969, at 66-67.
Freud's view is concisely set out in A Letter from Freud, 107 Am. J. PSYcHIATRY
786 (1951).
1 See, e.g., Marmor at 2, 9-10; L. OVESEY, HOMOSEXUALITY AND PSEUDOHOMO-
SEXUALITY 15-18 (1969). See also ScHur at 72-73.
" See, e.g., Bieber, Clinical Aspects of Male Homwsexuality in SEXUAL IN-
VERSIoN, supra note 24, at 248; GRouP at 3; Marmor at 10-12; ScHUJR at 72-73.
But see CtuRcHIlL at 260-322; Marmor at 16.
s' See sources cited note 32 supra.
8, See sources cited note 31 supra.
Frequently found in the personal history of a homosexual is a passive or
hostile father and a domineering mother. Parental influences, particularly during
the early years, appear to be a very important factor in the development of a
homosexual bent. See Group at 3; ScnuR at 74; Glueck at 196-201.
" The presentation in the text was an over-simplification of a very complex prob-
lem. There are many unknown quantities and many variations of theories involved
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The prognosis for reversing the homosexual penchant is dismal. All
men carry a latent homoerotic potential, but most successfully repress it
in their subconscious.3 7 Homosexuals, on the other hand, cannot repress
it because of the deep, underlying forces, instilled during youth, that
work against heterosexual adaptation. Psychotherapy may overcome
these forces if the patient both consciously and unconsciously really de-
sires, but it is seldom that his subconscious can abandon the role dictated
during the development of his personality. Hence, psychotherapy, a long
and difficult process, may be curative for only a few homosexuals and
beneficial to others only in the sense of enhancing social adjustment.88
Moreover, there is universal agreement that criminal and civil penalties
for, and societal hostility toward, homosexuality greatly hinder social
adjustment.3 9
in the development of homosexuality in an individual. For general discussions on
causation, see ELLIS; KINSEY/FEMALE at 447-48; L. OVESEY, HOMOSEXUALITY AND
PSEUDoHOMOSEXUALITY (1969); SEXUAL INVERSION: THE MULTIPLE ROOTS OF
HOMOSEXUALITY (J. Marmor ed. 1965); Glueck; Slovenko; TIME, Oct. 31, 1969,
at 66-67.
Homosexuals have become weary from having their sexual penchant analyzed.
As put by the founder and president of the Washington Mattachine Society:
[H]omosexuality has been defined into a sickness or disorder through sub-
jective personal, social, moral, cultural, and religious value judgments cloaked
and camouflaged in scientific language... [H]omosexuality cannot prop-
erly be considered to be a sickness, disorder, or pathology, nor a symptom
of any of these, but must be considered a preference, orientation, or pro-
pensity that is different from heterosexuality.
Kameny, The Federal Government vs. The Homosexual, THE HUMANIST, May/
June 1969, at 20. Kameny's views are also set forth in TIME, Oct. 31, 1969, at
66-67.
" GROUP at 2; Glueck at 194. Many psychiatrists believe that those who de-
nounce homosexuals the loudest are plagued by fears of their own latent homo-
sexuality. GEBHARD at 638 n.4; ScHUR at 113.
" See E. BERGLER, HOMOSEXUALITY: DISEASE OR WAY OF LIFE 10, 302 (1956);
GRouP at 3-4; ScHUR at 72; R. SLOVENKO, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW 91
(1965); Bowman and Engle at 280.
"" See, e.g., ELLIS, at 87-88; GEBHIARD at 623; Marmor at 20; Cantor at 448-51;
Glueck at 203; TIME, Oct. 31, 1969, at 64.
Many eminent commentators have long recognized the need for relaxing crim-
inal penalties for homosexual acts. Commonly, they reject the idea that such
sanctions effectively serve any worthwhile societal goals; rather, they believe
that much social harm may be caused by treating private, consensual homosexual
conduct as criminal. The moral foundation of the sanctions is regarded as an in-
adequate basis for the laws although reform is neither considered an approval nor
condonation of homosexuality nor a likely inducement for homosexual practices.
However, violations of public decency or other notorious acts, such as offensive
solicitation or the seduction of youth, are considered a proper concern of the law.
See generally F. CAPRIO & D. BRENNER, SEXUAL BPHAVIOR: PSYcHO-LEGAL
ASPECTS 162 (1961); CHURcHILL at 215-34; GREAT BRITAIN, COMMITTEE ON
(Vol. 48
1970] EMPLOYMENT POLICY TOWARD HOMOSEXUALS 921
The spectrum of personality of the homosexual is as wide and diverse
as that of the heterosexual,4" and his homoerotic bent alone reveals abso-
lutely nothing of his character and social adjustment. This penchant is
at most an indication of a unique constellation of factors influencing his
personality development that has led to his particular sexual propensities.
To say that the homosexual state demonstrates abnormality or perversity
is to beg the question. The pertinent inquiry is: what is his character,
and how well adjusted socially is he? Authorities are in agreement that
this query is answerable only by considering the homosexual individually
in his own setting, just as a heterosexual must be personally considered
in evaluating character and social adjustment.4 1
At present the federal government does not adequately consider indi-
-vidual circumstances before harshly penalizing an employee for homo-
sexual conduct. Failing to do so, in light of modern knowledge about
homosexual behavior, may therefore be deemed unreasonable and the
policy adjudged as irrational.12 That the policy is founded on public
opinion makes it no less irrational. Admittedly, the government must
be concerned with public confidence, but it must also recognize that it
HOmOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION, THE WOLFENDEN REPORT 42-48
(Amer. ed. 1963); H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 207.5, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); MODEL PENAL CODE
§§ 213.2-.6, 251.1-.3 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) ; Note, Deviate Sexual Behavior
Under the New Illinois Criminal Code, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 220; Note, Private
Consensual Homosexual Behavior: The Cri-ne and Its Enforcement, 70 YALE L.J.
623 (1961).
"'Hooker, Male Homosexuals and Their Worlds in SEXUAL INVERSION, supra
note 24, at 86-87; Marmor at 19. See also GEBHARD at 623, 642. There are prob-
ably more neurotics among homosexuals than among heterosexuals, but this fact
is inevitable in a hostile society. Marmor at 19; Cantor at 450.
"See, e.g., GEBHARD at 623; GROUP at 6; Hooker, Male Homosexuals and
Their Worlds in SEXUAL INVERSION, supra note 24, at 86-87; Marmor at 5, 16-19.
" See GROUP at 6; Marmor at 21; Szasz, Legal and Moral Aspects of Homo-
sexuality in SEXAL INVERSION, supra note 24, at 128, 138; Henkin, Morals and the
Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391, 407-11 (1963).
A recent report prepared under the auspices of the National Institute of Mental
Health not only urges reform of penal sanctions against private, consensual homo-
sexual practices but also urges tolerance of homosexuals by both private and
public employers. The distinguished task force that prepared the report included
this poignant remark:
The extreme opprobrium that our society has attached to homosexual
behavior has done more social harm than good, and goes beyond what is
necessary for the maintenance of public order and human decency. Homo-
sexuality presents a major problem for our society largely because of the
amount of injustice and suffering entailed in it, not only for the homo-
sexual but also for those concerned about him.
TIME, Oct. 24, 1969, at 82.
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often sets the trend in public attitudes and that its present policy toward
homosexuals tends to perpetuate hostility rather than to promote toler-
ance.43 Similar reasoning pertains to the problem of morale of em-
ployees.
Susceptibility to blackmail seems to be the primary reason for denying
homosexuals a security clearance, but that rationale breaks down in the
case of a professed homosexual who is not apprehensive of public dis-
closure of his sexual inclination. Furthermore, susceptibility to black-
mail largely stems from the homosexual's fear of losing his job, a fear
created in great part by present government policy. Heterosexuals may
become vulnerable to extortion too, but there is no reason to believe that
they could resist coercion any more successfully than homosexuals. 44
Adverse public attitudes toward homosexual conduct are not likely
to mollify within a short period of time, but the federal government
must weigh individual rights against popular prejudices. Through
prudent personnel management, the Civil Service could beneficially employ
homosexuals while minimizing the anxiety of the public and of fellow
employees. 5 For instance, counseling by a superior official might have
had a desirable restraining influence on the plaintiff in Norton v. Macy
4G
and possibly could have prompted him to seek professional help. He was
not employed in a position requiring him to meet the public, and what-
ever homosexual potential he may have had was not a part of the public
record.
The plaintiff in Schlegel v. United States47 presents a more difficult
problem due to his security clearance and the findings as to his particular
acts. He had been found to have used slight force once in an unsuccessful
attempt to accomplish sodomy on an unwilling partner, and the objects
" ScHUR at 110. See also Hyams, The Spurious Problem, NEW STATESMAN,
June 25, 1960, at 945-46; Wolfenden, The Homosexual, and the Law, Ahead of
Public Opinion?, NEw STATESMAN, June 25, 1960, at 941.
"'See Marmor at 21-22; Wicker, The Undeclared Witch-Hu1nt, HARPER'S,
Nov. 1969, at 108; Note, Governmient-Created Employment Disabilities of the
Homosexutal, supra note 11, at 1749-51.
"' For a reasoned plan by which the federal government could smoothly alter
its present policy toward homosexuals, see Note, Government-Created Employmeut
Disabilities of the Homosexual, supra note 11, at 1742-46. See also Bowman and
Engle at 316; TIME, Oct. 24, 1969, at 82.
The New York City Civil Service Commission has recently adopted a policy
of accepting homosexual workers except for some positions such as penitentiary
guards and playground attendants. Note, Government-Created Disabilities of the
Homosexual, supra; note 11, at 1745 n.30.
,6417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
' 416 F.2d 1372 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
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of all his ascribed homosexual advances were young servicemen.48 These
disturbing circumstances must be balanced, however, with his excellent
record of over eleven years of governmental service that was free of
trouble with the law.49 Again, perhaps counseling or a transfer would
have had an ameliorative effect.5"
In Adams v. Laird" the court's decision was partly based on findings
that the plaintiff had engaged in homosexual acts with two fellow em-
ployees. 2 Admittedly, sexual affairs among employees, whether homo-
sexual or heterosexual, may create problems at the place of work. In
Adams' case, however, there was no complaint against him, and his
homosexual propensities were not a matter of public knowledge. In order
not to lose his considerable technical skills but at the same time not
to endanger security requirements, the government might reasonably have
required him to present positive proof of his reliability in safeguarding
classified information, including perhaps a psychiatric evaluation.
As recognized in Norton, a homosexual may be a source of em-
barrassment to the Civil Service, as when he engages in notorious con-
duct. His personal behavioral traits may present other problems with
which the Civil Service should not have to cope. But Norton projects the
idea that job performance and compatibility with others turn on the whole
of a person's personality and integrity rather than solely on his private,
discreet sexual conduct. An individual's character and social adjustment,
his past work performance, the notoriety of and reasons for his conduct,
the nature of the job, and the alternative corrective measures available
should as a minimum be considered by the government before imposing
severe penalties on one merely for homosexual behavior. In short, indi-
vidual conduct must be individually treated; to do less may produce the
81Id. at 1373-74, 1383.
"' Schlegel v. United States, No. 369-63 at 19-20 (Ct. Cl., Oct. 17, 1969) (find-
ings of fact)."I DEP'T OF THE ARmY CIVILIAN PERSONNEL REGULATIONS S1.3-1b(3) (1961),
as quoted by the court in the findings of fact, Schlegel v. United States, No. 369-63
at 28-29, states:
Before proceeding with an action affecting an employee's employment or
pay status, consideration should be given to the possibility of correcting
the situation by counseling or training the employee, or through utilization
of a reassignment or an oral or written reprimand. In many instances, such
action will remedy the situation and, at the same time, will save the cost
of replacement or work disruption which attends the actions of removal or
suspension.
420 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
02Id. at 234.
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ill-effects of stigmatization and the needless loss of valuable skills to the
country.
WILLIAM B. CRUMPLER
Admiralty-Dockside Injuries under the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
In Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson1 three longshoremen had been
attaching cargo from railroad cars located on piers to ships' cranes for
loading onto the vessels. One longshoreman had been killed when cargo
hoisted by a crane knocked him to the pier or crushed him against the
side of the railroad car. The other two had been injured in the same
accident.
Deputy Commissioners of the United States Department of Labor
denied claims for compensation under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act2 in each case on the ground that the in-
juries had not occurred "upon the navigable waters of the United States,"
as required by the statute. The federal trial courts upheld the com-
missioners' decisions.3 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
in Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting4 reversed. The Supreme Court
on certiorari reversed the Fourth Circuit and held that the Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act did not cover longshore-
men injured on docks, piers, or bridges. The basic reasons for the
Court's denial of coverage to the longshoremen in Nacirema is best
explained by the historical development of state and federal jurisdiction
over maritime workers.
Although inadequate common-law remedies for injured workers led
to the adoption of state workmen's compensation statutes following the
industrial revolution,5 there was no corresponding federal development
1396 U.S. 212 (1969).
233 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964).
'Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 243 F. Supp. 184 (D. Md. 1965);
Traynor v. Johnson, 245 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Va. 1965).
' 398 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1968).
'The statutes of Washington, Iowa, and New York were constitutionally
sustained in aspects not concerning the extent of their coverage. Mountain Timber
Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210
(1917); New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). See G. GILmOra
& C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 3,37 (1957).
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